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| Battle of Gravelines | |||||||
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| Part of the Anglo-Spanish War | |||||||
| Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1588-08-08 by Philippe-Jacques de Loutherbourg, depicts the battle of Gravelines - painted in 1797, when the prospect of Spanish invasion was high on the English public agenda | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
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| Commanders | |||||||
| Elizabeth I of England Charles Howard Francis Drake | Philip II of Spain Duke of Medina Sidonia | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 34 warships 163 armed merchant vessels | 22 galleons 108 armed merchant vessels | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 50–100 deadLewis, The Spanish Armada, p. 184 ~400 wounded 6,000-8,000 died from disease | 600 dead, 800 wounded,Lewis, p. 182 397 captured, 4 merchant ships sunk or captured | ||||||
| Anglo-Spanish War |
|---|
| San Juan de Ulúa – Gravelines – Corunna – Lisbon – Spanish Main – Azores |
The Spanish Armada (Old Spanish: Grande y Felicísima Armada, meaning "Great and Most Fortunate Navy", also known as the Armada Invencible ("Invincible Navy")),This term was of English origin. was the Spanish fleet that sailed against England under the command of the Duke of Medina Sidonia in 1588.
King Philip II of Spain had been king consort of England until the death in 1558 of his wife, Queen Mary I of England, and he took exception to the policies pursued by her successor, Elizabeth I. The aim of his expedition was to invade England, thereby suppressing support for the United Provinces — part of the Spanish Netherlands — and cutting off attacks by the English against Spanish possessions in the New World and against the Atlantic treasure fleets. The king was supported by Pope Sixtus V, with the promise of a subsidy should the Armada make land. "The Spanish Armada". Catholic Encyclopedia. (1913). New York: Robert Appleton Company.
The Armada\'s appointed commander was the highly experienced Álvaro de Bazán, but he died in February 1588, and Medina Sidonia took his place. The fleet set out with 22 warships of the Spanish Royal Navy and 108 converted merchant vessels, with the intention of sailing through the English Channel to anchor off the coast of Flanders, where the Duke of Parma\'s army of tercios would stand ready for an invasion of the south-east of England.
The Armada achieved its first goal and anchored in the North Sea off Gravelines, at the coastal border area between France and the Spanish Netherlands. While awaiting communications from Parma\'s army, it was driven from its anchorage by an English fire ship attack, and in the ensuing battle at Gravelines the Spanish were forced to abandon their rendezvous with Parma\'s army.
The Armada managed to regroup and withdraw north, with the English fleet harrying it for some distance up the east coast of England. A return voyage to Spain was plotted, and the fleet sailed into the Atlantic, past Ireland. But severe storms disrupted the fleet\'s course, and more than 24 vessels were wrecked on the north and western coasts of Ireland, with the survivors having to seek refuge in Scotland. Of the fleet\'s initial complement, about 50 vessels failed to make it back to Spain.
The expedition was the largest engagement of the undeclared Anglo–Spanish War (1585–1604).
Contents |
Route taken by the Spanish Armada
On May 28 1588 the Armada set sail from Lisbon in Portugal, headed for the English Channel. The fleet was composed of around 130 ships, 8,000 sailors and 18,000 soldiers, and bore 1,500 brass guns and 1,000 iron guns; it took two days for the last vessel to leave port. In the Spanish Netherlands an army of 30,000 men awaited its arrival, the plan being to land the ship-bound force in the west of England and then use the fleet to convey the continental army to a place near London. All told, it was intended to muster 55,000 men, a huge army for that time. On the day of the fleet\'s departure, Elizabeth\'s ambassador in the Netherlands, Dr Valentine Dale, met Parma\'s representatives to begin peace negotiations. On July 17 negotiations were abandoned, and the English fleet stood prepared at Plymouth, awaiting news of Spanish movements.
The Armada was delayed by bad weather and was not sighted in England until July 19, when it appeared off St Michael\'s Mount in Cornwall. The news was conveyed to London by a system of beacons that had been constructed along the length of the south coast of England. During the evening the English fleet was trapped in Plymouth harbour by the incoming tide. The Spanish convened a council of war, where it was proposed to ride into the harbour on the tide and incapacitate the English ships at anchor and from there to attack England; but Medina Sidonia declined this advice, and that same night 55 ships of the English fleet set out in pursuit from Plymouth under the command of Lord Howard of Effingham and Sir John Hawkins. However, Hawkins acknowledged his subordinate, Sir Francis Drake, as the more experienced naval commander and gave him some control during the campaign.
In order to execute their "line ahead" attack, the English tacked upwind of the Armada, thus gaining a significant advantage. Over the next week there followed two inconclusive engagements, at Eddystone and the Isle of Portland. At the Isle of Wight the Armada had the opportunity to create a temporary base in protected waters and wait for word from Parma\'s army. In a full-scale attack, the English fleet broke into four groups with Drake coming in with a large force from the south. At the critical moment Medina Sidonia sent reinforcements south and ordered the Armada back in to open sea to avoid sandbanks, leaving two Spanish wrecks. There were no secure harbours nearby, so the Armada was compelled to make for Calais, without regard to the readiness of Parma\'s army.
On July 27, the Armada anchored off Calais in a tightly-packed defensive crescent formation, not far from Parma\'s army of 16,000, which was waiting at Dunkirk. There was no deep-water port where the fleet might shelter — always acknowledged as a major difficulty for the expedition — and the Spanish found themselves vulnerable as night drew on. At midnight on July 28 the English set alight eight fireships (filled with pitch, gunpowder, and tar) and cast them downwind among the closely-anchored vessels of the Armada. The Spanish feared these \'hellburners\'HellburnersPDF (143 KiB)., which had been used to deadly effect at the Siege of Antwerp.The Spanish Armada. London: The Folio Society.: two were intercepted and towed away, but the remainder bore down on the fleet. Medina Sidonia\'s flagship and the principal warships held their positions, but the rest of the fleet cut their cables and scattered in confusion, with the result that only one Spanish ship was burned. But the crescent formation had been broken, and the fleet now found itself too far to leeward of Calais in the rising south-westerly wind to recover its position. The English closed in for battle.
Gravelines was then part of Flanders in the Spanish Netherlands, close to the border with France and the closest Spanish territory to England. Medina Sidonia tried to re-form his fleet there, and was reluctant to sail further east owing to the danger from the shoals off Flanders, from which his Dutch enemies had removed the sea-marks. The Spanish army had been expected to join the fleet in barges sent from ports along the Flemish coast, but communications were far more difficult than anticipated, and without notice of the Armada\'s arrival Parma needed another six days to bring his troops up, while Medina Sidonia waited at anchor.
The English had learned more of the Armada\'s strengths and weaknesses during the skirmishes in the English Channel, and accordingly conserved their heavy shot and powder prior to their attack at Gravelines on August 8. During the battle, the Spanish heavy guns proved unwieldy, and their gunners had not been trained to reload — in contrast to their English counterparts, they fired once and then jumped to the rigging to attend to their main task as marines ready to board enemy ships. In fact, evidence from Armada wrecks in Ireland shows that much of the fleet\'s ammunition was never spent. Their determination to thrash out a victory in hand-to-hand fighting proved a weakness for the Spanish; it had been effective on occasions such as the Battle of Lepanto (1571) and at the Battle of Punta Delgada (1582), but the English were aware of this strength and sought to avoid it.
With its superior maneuverability, the English fleet provoked Spanish fire while staying out of range. Once the Spanish had lost their heavy shot, the English then closed, firing repeated and damaging broadsides into the enemy ships. This also enabled them to maintain a position to windward so that the heeling Armada hulls were exposed to damage below the water-line.
Eleven Spanish ships were lost or damaged (though most of the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic-class galleons escaped largely unscathed, some were lost or badly damaged in desperate individual rearguard actions against groups of English ships). The Spanish plan to join with Parma\'s army had been defeated, and the English had afforded themselves some breathing space. But the Armada\'s presence in northern waters still posed a great threat to England.
The threat of invasion from the Netherlands had not yet been discounted, and Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester maintained a force of 4,000 soldiers at West Tilbury, Essex, to defend the estuary of the River Thames against any incursion up-river towards London.
On August 8, Queen Elizabeth went to Tilbury to encourage her forces, and the next day gave to them what is probably her most famous speech: "My loving people, we have been persuaded by some that we are careful of our safety, to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes for fear of treachery; but, I do assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear, I have always so behaved myself, that under God I have placed my chiefs\' strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects; and, therefore, I am come amongst you as you see at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of battle, to live or die amongst you all - to lay down for my God, and for my kingdoms, and for my people, my honour and my blood even in the dust. I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king - and of a king of England too, and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which, rather than any dishonour should grow by me, I myself will take up arms - I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarded of every one of your virtues in the field. I know already, for your forwardness, you have deserved rewards and crowns, and, we do assure you, on the word of a prince, they shall be duly paid you. For the meantime, my Lieutenant-General Leicester shall be in my stead, than whom never prince commanded a more noble or worthy subject; not doubting but by your obedience to my General, by your concord in the camp, and your valour in the field, we shall shortly have a famous victory over these enemies of my God, of my kingdom and of my people."
On the day after the battle of Gravelines, the wind had backed southerly, enabling Medina Sidonia to move his fleet northward away from the French coast. Although their shot lockers were almost empty, the English pursued in an attempt to prevent the enemy from returning to escort Parma. On 12 August, Howard called a halt to the pursuit in the latitude of the Firth of Forth off Scotland. By that point, the Spanish were suffering from thirst and exhaustion, and the only option left to Medina Sidonia was to chart a course home to Spain, along the most hazardous parts of the Atlantic seaboard.
The Armada sailed around Scotland and Ireland into the North Atlantic. The ships were beginning to show wear from the long voyage, and some were kept together by having their hulls bundled up with cables. Supplies of food and water ran short, and the cavalry horses were cast overboard into the sea. Off the coasts of Scotland and Ireland the fleet ran into a series of powerful westerly gales, which drove many of the damaged ships off course and away from the safety of the open sea. Because so many anchors had been abandoned during the escape from the English fireships off Calais, many of the ships were incapable of securing shelter as they reached the coast of Ireland and were driven on to the rocks. Therefore they were much closer to Ireland than planned, a devastating navigational error. The late 1500s, and especially 1588, were marked by unusually strong North Atlantic storms, likely associated with a high accumulation of polar ice off the coast of Greenland, a characteristic phenomenon of the "Little Ice Age." Brian Fagan, The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History 1300-1850, pp. 91-94. New York: Basic Books, 2000. ISBN 0-465-02271-5. As a result many more ships and sailors were lost to cold and stormy weather than in combat actions. -->
Following the gales it is reckoned that 5,000 men died, whether by drowning and starvation or by execution at the hands of English forces in Ireland. The reports from Ireland abound with strange accounts of brutality and survival, and attest on occasion to the brilliance of Spanish seamanship. The ships that survived the storms headed for Ireland. They were convinced that they would get help and supplies. The Catholic Spanish believed that those with the same religion would help them. However, they were wrong. The sailors who went ashore were attacked and killed. The Irish, Catholic or not, still saw the Spanish as invaders.
In the end, 67 ships and around 10,000 men survived. Many of the men were near death from disease, as the conditions were very cramped and most of the ships ran out of food and water. Many more died in Spain, or on hospital ships in Spanish harbours, from diseases contracted during the voyage. It was reported that, when Philip II learned of the result of the expedition, he declared, "I sent my ships to fight against the English, not against the elements". Greatly disappointed, he still forgave the Duke of Medina Sidonia.
English diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire hoped to distract Spanish forces in the Mediterranean, where Turkish naval maneouvres might threaten Spanish possessions in Italy.
As the Guardian Arts Correspondent, John Ezard, put it:
| “ |
Jerry Brotton, a lecturer at Royal Holloway College, London, told the Guardian Hay literary festival that a hitherto unnoticed letter from Elizabeth\'s security chief and spymaster, Sir Francis Walsingham, to her ambassador in Istanbul showed that it was Turkish naval manoeuvres rather than Drake\'s swashbuckling which delivered the fatal blow to the Spanish invasion plans. The letter, which ordered the ambassador, William Harborne, to incite the Turks to harry the Spanish navy, was written in the mid-1580s and has been buried in archives ever since because it did not apparently relate to any major historical event. | ” |
It is possible that such an action could have reduced the available Spanish naval forces for their invasion of England, but the reaction of the Ottomans is unknown.
English losses were comparatively few, and none of their ships were sunk. But after the victory, typhus and dysentery killed many sailors and troops (estimated at 6,000–8,000) as they languished for weeks in readiness for the Armada\'s return out of the North Sea. Then a demoralising dispute occasioned by the government\'s fiscal shortfalls left many of the English defenders unpaid for months, which was in contrast to the assistance given by the Spanish government to its surviving men.
Although the English fleet was unable to prevent the regrouping of the Armada at the Battle of the Gravelines, requiring it to remain on duty even as thousands of its sailors died, the outcome vindicated the strategy adopted, resulting in a revolution in naval warfare with the promotion of gunnery, which until then had played a supporting role to the tasks of ramming and boarding. The battle of Gravelines is regarded by specialists in military history as reflecting a lasting shift in the naval balance in favour of the English, in part because of the gap in naval technology and armament it confirmed between the two nations,[citation needed] which continued into the next century.[citation needed] In the words of Geoffrey Parker, by 1588 \'the capital ships of the Elizabethan navy constituted the most powerful battlefleet afloat anywhere in the world.\'Geoffrey Parker, \'The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England\', Mariner\'s Mirror, 82 (1996): 273.. Modern historians now recognize that the Armada campaign did not have consequences on the naval balance of power. In fact it led the Spanish Navy to undergo a major reform which helped it continue to dominate the European waters until the mid 18th century [1].
In England, the boost to national pride lasted for years, and Elizabeth\'s legend persisted and grew well after her death. The repulse of Spanish naval might gave heart to the Protestant cause across Europe, and the belief that God was behind the Protestant cause was shown by the striking of commemorative medals that bore the inscription, He blew with His winds, and they were scattered. There were also more lighthearted medals struck, such as the one with the play on Julius Caesar\'s words: Venit, Vidit, Fugit (he came, he saw, he fled). The victory was acclaimed by the English as their greatest since Agincourt.[citation needed]
However, an attempt in the following year to press home the English advantage failed when an English Armada met a similar fate, limping home after being held by the Spanish on the coasts of Portugal. The supply of troops and munitions from England to Philip II\'s enemies in the Netherlands and France continued, and high seas buccaneering against the Spanish persisted, but with dwindling success. The Anglo-Spanish War thereafter generally favoured Spain. It was not until half a century later that the Dutch broke Spanish dominance at sea at the Battle of the Downs in 1639. The strength of Spain\'s tercios — the dominant fighting unit in European land campaigns for over a century — was likewise broken by the French at the Battle of Rocroi in 1643.
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Fireships expended 7 August: (included in above)
São Martinho 48 (section flag, Duke of Medina Sidonia)
São João 50 (Martinez Recalde, section vice-flag)
São Marcos 33 (Don Lopez de Mendoza) — Sunk 10 September near coast of Ireland
São Filipe 40 (Don Francisco de Toledo) — Aground and abandoned by own crew on 8 August between Nieupoort and Ostend, later captured by Dutch 9 August
São Luís 38 (Don Agustin Mexia)
São Mateus 34 —(D. Diego Pimentel) Aground 8 August between Nieupoort and Ostend, captured by Dutch 9 August
Santiago 24
Galeon from Florence 52 (or San Francesco Florentian galeon included in the portuguese fleet, Niccolo Bartoli)
São Cristóvão 20
São Bernardo 21
Augusta 13
Júlia 14
Santa Ana 30 (section flag, Juan Martínez de Recalde)
El Gran Grin 28 (section vice-flag) — Aground c. 24 September, Clare Island
Santiago 25
La Concepcion de Zubelzu 16
La Concepcion de Juan del Cano 18
La Magdalena 18
San Juan 21
La María Juan 24 — Sunk 8 August north of Gravelines
La Manuela 12
Santa María de Montemayor 18
María de Aguirre 6
Isabela 10
Patache de Miguel de Suso 6
San Esteban 6
San Crístobal 36 (section flag, Diego Flores de Valdés)
San Juan Bautista 24 (section vice-flag)
San Pedro 24
San Juan 24
Santiago el Mayor 24
San Felipe y Santiago 24
La Asuncion 24
Nuestra Señora del Barrio 24
San Linda y Celedon 24
Santa Ana 24
Nuestra Señora de Begoña 24
La Trinidad Bogitar 24
Santa Catalina 24
San Juan Bautista 24
Nuestra Señora del Rosario 24
San Antonio de Padua 12
Santa Ana 47 (section flag, Miguel deflag) — Damaged 8 August, wrecked 16 September, Blaskett Sound, Ireland
San Salvador 25 — Damaged by explosion and captured c. 31 July
San Esteban 26 — Wrecked 20 September, Ireland
Santa Marta 20
Santa Bárbara 12
San Buenaventura 21
La María San Juan 12
Santa Cruz 18
Doncella 16 — Sank at Santander after returning to Spain
Asuncion 9
San Bernabe 9
Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe 1
La Madalena 2
La Regazona lgonio 30 (section flag, Martín de Bertandona)
La Lavia 25 (section vice-flag)
La Rata Santa María Encoronada 35 (Leiva)
San Juan de Sicilia 26 (formerly Brod Martolosi) — Blew up (possibly sabotage from English agent) 5 November Tobermory Bay, Scotland
La Trinidad Valencera 42 — aground 8 August
La Anunciada 24 (formerly Presveta Anuncijata) — Scuttled 19 September at Shannon River mouth
San Nicolas Prodaneli 26 (formerly Sveti Nikola)
La Juliana 32
Santa María de Vison 18
La Trinidad de Scala 22
El Gran Grifón pogitor 38 (section flag, Juan Gómez de Medina) — Aground 8 August
San Salvador 24 (section vice-flag)
Perro Marino 7
Falcon Blanco Mayor 16
Castillo Negro 27
Barca de Amburg 23 — sank
Casa de Paz Grande 26
San Pedro Mayor 29
El Sanson 18
San Pedro Menor 18
Barca de Danzig 26
Falcon Blanco Mediano 16 (Don Luis de Cordoba?) — Wrecked c. 25 September
San Andres 14
Casa de Paz Chica 15
Ciervo Volante 18
Paloma Blanca 12
La Ventura 4
Santa Bárbara 10
Santiago 19
David 7
El Gato 9
San Gabriel 4
Esayas 4
San Lorenzo 50 (Don Hugo de Moncada) — Aground, captured 8 August, distracting the English fleet. Moncada was killed defending his ship.
Zúñiga 50 - Made landfall in Count Clare, Ireland with a damaged rutter; then went back to sea, reaching Le Havre in France. It is uncertain whether this galleass made it back to Spanish waters.
Girona 50 — Wrecked at Lacada Point near Giant\'s Causeway, 26 October 1588.
Napolitana ("Patrona") 50
Also
22 pataches and zabras (Don Antonio Hurtado de Medoza)
4 galleys of 5 guns each (Diego de Medrano)
including Bazana — Wrecked c. 26 July near Bayonne
Princessa
Diana
None reached England.
There were other vessels under Parma.
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